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PATENTED ARTICLES AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS
NELSON ROSENBAUM
Modern warfare having caused the scientist to discover, and the industrial-
ist to accept novelideas, we have been promised that the postwar era will be
a period of new and more efficient machines and processes, with different
and better materials. Military security now prevents the disclosure of many
of the innovations,' but their use and improvement is a matter of daily
occurrence in military preparation and battle.
When peace is achieved, these modern implements, almost invariably pro-
tected by patent grants or controlled by monopolies, will be ready for civilian
use. Sound public administration will call for the use of these newer, more
efficient, and, often, cheaper inventions. Will public agencies, acting in com-
pliance with statutory procedures prescribed for them, be able to procure
these new devices ?3- That is the problem which will be discussed here.
Most public agencies in this country must award contracts in excess of five
hundred dollars by competitive bidding, i.e., to the lowest, or lowest respon-
sible bidder.2 Statutes requiring competitive bidding have been adopted with
a view towards insuring economy in the public administration3 so that "the
public may receive the benefit of the greatest possible value for the least
expenditure," 4 with the view of promoting honesty, fidelity and good morali-
ty in the administration of contract awards,5 and, lastly, to eliminate favor-
itism.6
lWhere the disclosure of an invention by the granting of a patent might be detri-
mental, the Commissioner of Patents may order that the invention be kept secret and
withhold the grant of the patent for such period as the national interest requires.
40 STAT. 394 (1917), anended, 54 STAT. 710 (1940), 55 STAT. 657 (1941), 35 U. S. C.
§§ 42-42f (1940, Supp. 1943). A discussion of this type of legislation will be found in
Stewart, Jr., Patents: War Secrecy and Beyond (1942) 30 GEo. L. J. 285.
I'The research department of Curtis Publishing Company has recently conducted a
survey of 350 major industries, which revealed that 58 percent of the companies inter-
viewed are planning some kind of new product or products for the post-war days. The
New York Times, January 15, 1944.2 Flynn Construction Co. v. Leininger, 125 Okla. 197, 201, 257 Pac. 375, 378 (1927)
Great Northern Railway Co. v. City of .Leavenworth, 81 Wash. 511, 825, 142 Pac. 1155,
1159 (1914. See Rosenbaum, Criteria for Awarding Public Contracts to the Lowest Re-
spionsible Bidder (1942) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 37.3 Harlem Gaslight Co. v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 309, 329 (1865).4 Chapman v. Reiter, 177 Wash. 392, 397, 31 P. (2d) 1005, 1007 (1934).5 Harlem Gaslight Co. v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 309 (1865) ; Hannan v. Board of Education,
25 Okla. 372, 377, 378, 107 Pac. 646, 648, 649 (1909).
6lbid. Justice Vann, before being elevated to the New York Court of Appeals, de-
scribed favoritism in relation to awarding public contracts as "one of the most in-
sidious and dangerous kinds of fraud." Lamed v. City of' Syracuse, 17 App. Div. 19, 26,
44 N. Y. Supp. 857, 859 (1897).
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The procurement of a patented article or process7 on the basis of com-
petitive bidding has been under judicial consideration for three quarters of
a century.8 The problem arises because competitive .bidding requires bid-
ders to submit proposals on equal terms, usually in response to definite
specifications ;9 but this equality obviously cannot exist when the article or
process specified is patented, since the patentee has "an exclusive right to
make, use and vend the particular device described and claimed in the
patent."' 0 Of course, were there no legal compulsion for competitive bidding,
patented articles could be purchased by public officials without restraint and
by private negotiation." But because generally there is such legal compul-
sion, public officials in some jurisdictions have been unable to obtain a
valuable specified article because, being patented, it did not lend itself
to competitive bidding.' 2 Public officials in other jurisdictions have
gotten over this hump by saying that statutes requiring competitive bidding
have no application to patented articles.'3 Jurisdictions adhering to the
former course of excluding the acquisition of patented articles are said to
follow the "Wisconsin" rule, while jurisdictions permitting the acquisition
of patented articles come under the "Michigan" rule.
Neither of these rules alone could be expected to prove saqsfactory. The
former, or "exclusion" rule, if followed strictly, would impair the efficacy of
the public service; while the latter, or "permissive" rule, if similarly applied,
might lead to abuses and loss to the public treasury. For example, in a
case where a patented article is named in a contract together with unpatented
materials on which competition could readily be procured, the supplier of
7The terms "patented article" and "patented process" are used in this article inter-
changeably.8Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dec. 205 (1868) ; Hobart v. City of Detroit,
17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185 (1868).
ORicketson v. City of Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 591, 81 N. W. 864 (1900).
In Flyni Construction Co. Inc. v. Leininger, 125 Okla. 197, 201, 257 Pac. 375, 378 (1927)
the court said that "competitive bidding means bidding upon the same thing, upon the iden-
tical undertaking, upon the same material items in the subject matter." 3 McQUMLN,
MuNICIPAL CoaRoRAT-iows (2d rev. ed. 1943) § 1313. Matter of McNutt v. Eckert, 257
N. Y. 100, 104, 177 N. E. 386, 387 (1931) ; Davies v. Village of Madelia, 205 Minn. 526,
532, 287 N. W. 1, 4 (1939) ; State ex rel. Sanders v. Grisso, 184 Okla. 348, 350, 87 P.
(2d) 155, 157-158 (1939).
10Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 62 Sup. Ct. 402 (1942).
lYarnold v. City of Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126 (1875); Kansas City Transfer Co. v.
Huling, 22 Mo. App. 654 (1886); Warren v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 115 Mo. 572,
22 S. W. 490 (1893) ; Bunker v. Hutchinson, 74 Kan. 651, 87 Pac. 884 (1906) ; Diling-
ham v. Spartanburg, 75 S. C. 549, 56 S. E. 381 (1907).
'
2Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dec. 205 (1868).
'
8 Hobart v. City of Detroit, 17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185 (1868); Hoffman v. City
of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N. W. 430, 77 A. L. R. 680 (1930); Smith v. City
of Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P. (2d) 588 (1937).
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the patented article would have an opportunity to charge exorbitant prices
upon the unpatented items.14 Some jurisdictions which recognized the per-
missive rule, becoming alarmed over the possible abuses of this rule by public
officials,' 5 enacted statutes securing competition as the sole criterion for
awarding contracts. 6 Subsequent experiences in other localities showed
that these legislative fears were not altogether unwarranted.17 On the other
hand, where the exclusion rule was sanctioned, the legislature came to the aid
of public corporations, making available to them newly invented patented de-
vices by authorizing their purchase under conditions which maintained some
form of competition1s
141n Matter of Eager, 46 N. Y. 100, 106 (1871) the court said: "Even if we should
hold that patented articles may be contracted for by the city, notwithstanding the im-
possibility of competition, we ought to stop there, and not go to the length of sanction-
ing a practice, whereby competition may be prevehted, by unnecessarily coupling a
work not patented, with one which is patented, and advertising for an entire proposal
for the whole."
15In Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263 (1872) it was said (p. 270) : "If they
(public officials) invite proposals'for a particular thing or process, they necessarily in so
doing exclude everything else which might be substituted for the thing called for; and
there is no clearer field for corruption and favoritism than in shaping proposals, if in
fact the city is in corrupt hands."
'1In 1872, in Matter of Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513, the permissive rule was adopted. The
next year the legislature adopted a statutory method for procuring patented articles
for the City of New York. The statute as enacted (L. 1873, Ch. 335,, § 115, as amended,
L 1873, Ch. 757, § 22) provided: "***, except for repairs no patented pavement shall
be laid, and no patented article shall be advertised for, contracted for or purchased.
Except under such circumstances that there can be a fair and reasonable opportunity for
competition, the conditions to secure which shall be prescribed by the board of estimate
and apportionment." The present charter of the City of New York still contains the
foregoing provisions, but there has been added this additional provision: "unless the
board of estimate [formerly the board of estimate and apportionment] by a three-fourths
vote shall find that it is to the, interest of the city in a particular case to purchase and
shall authorize the purchase of a patented article as to which competition cannot be
secured." (§ 348 New York city charter [1938]).
17In 1920 there developed in Essex County, New Jersey, a so-called "patented paving
scandal" owing to the fact that the paving of certain roads was limited to two patented
pavements. As a result, there was enacted in 1923 an act known as the "Open Specifica-
tion for Public Paving" (Ch. 188, Pub. L. 1923, N. J. STAT ANN. (1940) tit. 27, ch. 2,
§ 4) which provides: "If a patented, proprietary pavement or paving material, or in-
gredients used in paving, is included in the specifications, the body having charge of the
work shall not only specify such type of construction, but shall also place in the specifica-
tions one or more equivalent types of construction upon which no patent exists, or upon
which there is no proprietary right or condition, as an alternate type, and bids shall be
asked for on the various types so specified. The award shall be made to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder on the types of construction so placed in competition." The history of
the factual background for this law will be found in REED, TWENTY YEARS OF GovERN-
MENT IN EssEx COUNTY, NEW JERSEY (1938) ch. V.
18 In Wisconsin, after the adoption of the rule in Deanr v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, 99 Am.
Dec. 205 (1868), the legislature provided in the city charter of Milwaukee (1914, c. 5,
§ 23) that the city could purchase the right to use any patented article at a stipulated
royalty to the patent holder for improvements payable out of assessment funds.
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In order to secure as much competition as might be available, even though
patented articles were specified, two additional methods commonly known as
the "equal opportunity"' 9 and "alternate"20 rules, were adopted in some
states. Furthermore, the so-called "repair" rule2 ' was introduced to solve the
problem of whether parts essential for replacements of patented articles
acquired by public agencies had to be purchased by competitive bidding.
Much of the remainder of this paper will be taken up with a discussion
of these various rules.
The Wisconsin Rule
The Wisconsin rule, prohibiting the specification of a patented article
in a public contract required to be awarded on competitive bids, had its
origin in Dean v. Charlton. 2 2 In this case the improvement called for the
grading of a street and the laying of a patented pavement. The cost of
this improvement was to be paid by assessments levied upon the abutting
property. One firm had the exclusive right. to lay the specified patented
pavement. There was no general power in the municipality to do this work
at the expense of the abutting property owners. The power to lay pave-
ments and assess their cost against the abutting property arose from a
special statute which required the contract for such work to be awarded to
the lowest responsible bidder. It was held that the naming of a patented
article thwarted the very basis upon which the power to pave the street
was given, the securing of competition for the work, and such competition
19Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St. 585 (1885) ; Kilvington v. City of Superior, 83
Wis. 222, 53 N. W. 487, 18 L. R. A. 45 (1892); Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212
Iowa 867, 232 N. W. 430, 77 A. I-. R. 680 (1930).
20 Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263 (1872) ; Brener v. City of Philadelphia,
305 Pa. St. 182, 157 Atl. 466 (1931). See Note (1935) 96 A. L. R. 712, discussing the
validity of alternate plans or materials in proposals for bids on public contracts.21Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Allentown, 153 Pa. St. 319, 26 Atl. 646 (1893).
2223 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dec. 205 (1868). The argument was advanced in this case
that the willingness of the holders of the patent to sell the right -to lay the patented
pavement at the same sum per square yard to any person secured the competition in-
tended by the statute. This claim was rejected on the ground that any person could
buy the exclusive right to lay the patented pavement in the location in question, so that
the successful bidder might find himself at the mercy of the buyer of such patented
pavement rights, which situation would not create competition, but would deter it.
However, the court did indicate a method by which all the available competition could
be secured when patented articles are specified, which has since been largely adopted
and is known as the "equal opportunity" rule. See text infra at page 342 et seq. In Neacy
v. City of Milwaukee, 171 Wis. 311, 176 N. W. 871, as late as 1920, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin expressed its adherence to the rule of Dean v. Charlton and ex-
plained its meaning to be "that any article which is not a subject of competitive bidding
is obnoxious to the provisions of city charters requiring that all contracts should be let
pursuant to competitive bidding."
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"was not preserved in the letting of this contract; and it was, therefore,
beyond the scope and in violation of the spirit of the charter." Other courts
which follow the exclusion rule stress the necessity of having "real and
practical competition" 23 for the work, and argue that "no one can compete,
on equal terms, with a man who controls the sale of the thing needed,
'24
and that under these conditions "there can hardly be a lowest bidder."2 5
In some instances where assessable improvements are undertaken, the
statute provides that after competitive bids are received for such work, if a
given percentage of the property owners desire to take over the contract
themselves they may do so. This is allowed, no doubt, to enable the prop-
erty owners to perform the work at a price less than that of the lowest
bidder. In such a case it has been held that the specification of a patented
'article is illegal, since there can be but one bidder and the property owners
could not exercise their right to take over the contract without coming to
terms with the patentee or paying heavy damages for infringement. 26
Ulnder the Wisconsin rule it is illegal to contract for the delivery of an
unpatented article under a coined or trade name.2 7 It is also impyoper to
let a contract for an article which is in fact patented, although the contract
deceptively does not designate it as such; and in such a case the court will
receive evidence that the article mentioned is patented.
2 8
When it is illegal to include a patented article in a public contract, a con-
tractor cannot even recover for the performance of the unpatented work,
because the patented ,article precluded all persons, other than the patentee,
from successfully securing the contract.2 9 However, where the contract does
not demand a patented device, a contractor's voluntary use of a patented
contrivance does not prevent the contractor from claiming the contract price
for the work so performed.3 0
The Michigan Rule
The Michigan, or liberal rule, allowing the designation of a patented arti-
23Burgess v. City of Jefferson, 21 Ia. Ann. 143 (1869).24Temple v. City of Portland, 77 Or. 559, 151 Pac. 724 (1915); State v. City of
Elizabeth, 35 N. J. L. 351 (1872).
25bid.26Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 (1868).27Seibert v. City of Indianapolis, 40 Ind. App. 296, 81 N. E. 99 (1907): Saxon v.
City of Nexw Orleans, 124 La. Ann. 717, 50 So. 662 (1909); Terwilliger Land Co. v.
City of Portland, 62 Or. 101, 123 Pac. 57 (1912).28 Village of Rossville v. Smith, 256 Ill. 302, 100 N. E. 292 (1912) ; Schoel1kopf v. City
of Chicago, 294 Ill. 110, 128 N. E. 337 (1920).29Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Fay, 35 Cal. 695 (1868).
5ODunne v. Altschul, 57 Cal. 472 (1881).
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cle in a public contract to be awarded'on competitive bids, was enunciated
in Hobart v. City of Detroit3' upon facts similar to Dean v. Charlton, supra.
The argument raised by counsel that the specification of a patented pavement
was illegal as preventing the competition intended by the statute, was re-
jected on the ground that such a holding would deprive the public agencies
of the use of newer, more useful, and in some instances cheaper inventions.
The court dispelled the fear that a public agency was helpless against paying
exorbitant prices for a patented contrivance by pointing out that the award-
ing officer could reject an unreasonable bid, and concluded that the require-
ment of competitive bidding was intended to secure competition only when
practicable.
The claim that .calling for a patented article does not "admit of competi-
tive bids," where contracts are required to be let to the lowest bidder, has
been rejected by other courts upon the reasoning that the selection of the
materials to be used in constructing a public improvement rests in the
discretion of the designated public officer or body, whose discretion should
not be curtailed or limited by a general directory provision providing for
competitive bids. It has also been held that statutes such as those in ques-
tion merely prescribing forms of procedure for the activities of public
bodies, are obligatory only to the extent to which they are applicable by
their terms; that the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended that a
power shall be exercised or work contracted for only if admitting of competi-
tive bidding. Therefore, if an article specified does not lend itself to com-
petition, nevertheless, a public officer has power to specify it, and the article
may be considered as an exception to the statutory provision requiring the
receipt of competitive bids.3 2
Other courts adopting the permissive rule do so on the basis of public
necessity and welfare, pointing out that it was "never intended that the city
authorities should be unable to make a contract, however necessary to the
public welfare such contract might be, if the article desired, or the manner
of performance of the contract, required the use of a patented article."
' '
3117 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185 (1868) ; see also Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich.
495, 515 (1869).
82Matter of Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513 (1872). Prior to this decision, Mr. Justice Ingraham,
in Astor v. The Mayor, N. Y. Daily Transcript, February 8, 1869, speaking for the
General Term, in upholding the validity of a contract calling for a patented pavement,
stated that the legislature, when it originally adopted the requirement for competitive
bidding on public contracts, did not have in mind the question of patented articles; and
if it intended to preclude the use of patented articles by public agencies, it would have
so stated in express language. See also State ex rel. Stamford v. Board of Purchase
and Supplies, 111 Conn. 147, 157, 149 Atl. 411, 413 (1930).33Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22, 13 S. W. 98, 8 L. R. A. 110 (1890).
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Where a statute authorizes the use of a particular patented article, pro-
vided bids therefor are advertised for, and a contract is awarded in com-
pliance with such provisions, the contract is valid, even though there be but
one bidder, the patentee. For the legislature is presumed to have known,
at the time it enacted the statute, that the patented article was suchthat it
might not be the subject of competition. The provision for advertising for
bids to furnish the patented article is not a restriction upon the contracting
officer's power to secure the patented implement, but is "merely a regulation
of the mode of discharging" the duty imposed upon him "in obtaining pro-
posals" .for such article.34
The right to specify a patented article does not authorize a contracting
officer to include it in one contract with work which is unpatented and
capable of separate performance and for which competition can be secured.35
A contract so awarded is void.3 6 By combining these two items in one con-
tract, competition is excluded on that for which competition may be obtained.
The proper practice to follow in such a case is to receive separate proposals
for the work capable of being performed separately.
Often the charge is made that the specified patented device possesses no
superiority or other advantage over another unpatented one. The courts,
however, are loath to set aside the judgment of public officers acting in good
faith.3 7 To cast aside such selection there must be proof of bad faith, not
In Holbrook v Toledo, 18 Ohio Cir. Dec. 284, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 284 (1906), a
similar doctrine of pragmatism was laid down regarding the specification of patented
articles by public agencies. The court there said (pp. 296-297): "Wherever the ex-
clusive right to a thing is owned or controlled, it has seemed to us that the people of
a city ought not to be deprived of an opportunity to avail themselves of a useful and
valuable thing simply because it is so controlled. And this kind of monopoly which we
guard by the issuing of letters patent is a monopoly which has been encouraged, because
it stimulates inventive genius and in the end results in great good to humanity. Not
much encouragement would be given to the inventor of a patented pavement if his
market were restricted to individuals, if municipalities were shut out of the number
of purchasers of that which he has invented. Individuals do not ordinarily buy pave-
ments. And the question then comes, whether it is,public policy to discourage inventions
along this line which in the end may inure to the highest benefit of the cities. *** it is
wise that the people who have organized themselves into municipalities should be free
to avail themselves of every beneficent invention keeping pace with the world's progress."
See also Saunders v. City of Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111 N. W. 529, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.)
392 (1907); Smith v. City of Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P. (2d) 588 (1937).34Greaton v. Griffin, 4 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 310 (1868).35Matter of Eager, 46 N. Y. 100 (1871) ; Temple v. City of Portland, 77 Or. 559,
151 Pac. 725 (1915).36Matter of Eager, 46 N. Y. 100 (1871).
37Meek v. City of Chillicothe, 181 Mo. App. 218, 167 S. W. 1139 (1914); Wegmann
Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis, 329 Mo. 972, 47 S. W. (2d) 770 (1932) ; Hillig v. City
of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 291, 296, 85 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935) ; Beckwith v. City of New
Rochelle, 138 Misc. 62, 245 N. Y. Supp. 21 (1929), afr'd, 230 App. Div. 785, 245 N. Y.
Supp. 21 (2d Dep't 1930).
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evidence of bad judgment, for otherwise the courts would be substituting
their judgment for that of the public officials charged with the duty of mak-
ing the necessary selections, and deprive public agencies of the opportunity
to secure those things best suited for their purposes, and, often, at lower
prices38
In applying the permissive rule in practice, the question of advertising for
bids arises. Some decisions hold that such advertising is not required,
because there is no opportunity for competition and negotiation of the con-
tract is more appropriate39 A similar conclusion was reached where the
patented article (parking meters) had not been sufficiently developed to permit
the drawing of a definite competitive specification." A legal requirement for
obtaining a minimum of two bids as a condition precedent to an award of
a public contract does not apply where the permissive rule is followed. 41
On the other hand, it has been decided that a contract for a patented device
is subject to the statute requiring advertising for bids and the failure to do
so voids the contract awarded. 42 One view taken of this question is that to
neglect to advertise for bids would permit the secret negotiatiorf of public
contracts without the beneficial advantage of publicity, and that even patented
articles may be subject to competition on the part of numerous licensees of
such ariles.43 Clearly, however, when the statute provides for competitive
bidding, except where the circumstances "do not admit of competition," a
contract for a patented pavement controlled by one person in the locality
may be entered into without advertising for bids,44 whereas this would not be
so in the case of the purchase of an automobile, 45 because such an article
3 8Meek v. City of Chillicothe, and Wegmann Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis, supra,
note 37; Beckwith v. City of New Rochelle, mspra, note 37.39Astor v. Mayor, N. Y. Daily Transcript, February 8, 1869 (Gen. Term, 1st Dep't),;
People v. Van Nort, 65 Barb. 331 (Gen. Term, 1st Dep't 1873) ; Baird v. Mayor, 96
N. Y. 567, 582 (1884); Silsby Manufacturing Co. v. Allentown, 153 Pa. St. 319, 26
Atl. 646 (1893) ; Addressograph Sales Agency v. County of Lucerne, 32 Lucerne Leg.
Reg. 444 (1938).4 0Hodgeman v. City of San Diego, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 610, 128 P. (2d) 412 (1942).
Appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied, 53 Cal. App. (2d)
619, 128 P. (2d) 412 (1942).41State ex tel. City of Stamford v. Board of Purchase and Supply, 111 Conn. 147,
149 Atl. 410 (1930).4 2Limestone County v. Knox, 234 S. W. 131, rehearing denied (1921), cited with
approval in Vilbig Bros. v. City of Dallas, 127 Tex. 563, 91 S. W. (2d) 336 (1936),
motion for rehearing overruled, 127 Texas 573, 96 S. W. (2d) 229 (1936).43Worthington v. City of Boston, 41 Fed. 23 (D. Mass. 1890), rev'd on other groulus,
152 U. S. 695, 14 Sup. Ct. 737 (1894).44Lord v. City and County of Honolulu, 20 Haw. 175 (1910). A similar provision has
been added to the New York City Charter, but this provision requires a three-fourths
vote of the board of estimate before it becomes effective, supra note 16.
45West v. County of Hawaii, 24 Haw. 310 (1918). The purchase of automotive equip-
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does admit of competition. In the absence of judicial precedent or statutory
dispensation, and as a matter of proper administrative practice, for the
purpose of protecting the contract awarded from possible attack, the re-
quirement for advertising for bids should be observed, for "disclosure is
the antidote to partiality and favor." 46
Monopolized Articles
Often there exists an article or product, which is not patented, but is of
especial excellence. These commodities may be of exclusive manufacture,
i.e., a proprietary article; or their source, if mined or quarried, may be within
the control of one individual or corporation. Like patented articles, they
too do not lend themselves to competition. Here again the question arises
whether they may be procured by public agencies when competitive bidding
is required.
When the product specified is held in monopoly in the community where
the work is to be performed, it has been held that, though such a product
was properly requested by the required percentage of property owners, it
cannot be legally specified.47 A similar holding was founded on the premise
that even if a certain monopolized product was most suitable for a con-
templated project, such product should not be used, but should merely be
adopted as the standard of quality and fitness, and material equal to it
should be used.48  In other words, to secure desirable material a public
agency "must not be the victim" of a fMlonopoly.49 , This criterion of "or equal".
has received sharpjudicial criticism.60 But, if the specified material is sold
in the open market, the fact that one company produces and sells most of
it does not invalidate its selection, even in those jurisdictions that object to
a public corporation being the "victim" of a monopoly, since a contractor
may procure it from a competitor of the dominant company.5'
The opposite view has been taken by many courts,52 upon the theory
that when a public official believes in good faith that a certain monopolized
ment, without competitive bidding, where the statute calls for such competition, is
illegal. McRoberts v. Ammons, 104 Colo. 96, 88 P. (2d) 958 (1939).46Fordham Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 291, 155 N. E. 575, 578 (1927).
47Boon v. City of Utica, 5 Misc) 391, 25 N. Y. Supp. 846 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; Monaghan
v. City of Indianapolis, 37 Ind. App. 280, 76 N. E. 424 (1905) ; Fineran Bitulithic Pav-
ing Co., 116 Ky. 495, 76 S. W. 415 (1903).48Fishburn v. City of Chicago, 171 IIl. 338, 49 N. E. 532, 39 L. R. A. 482 (1898).
49Schoellkopf v. City of Chicago, 294 Ill. 110, 128 N. E. 337 (1920).50City of Springfield v. Haydon, 216 Ky. 483, 288 S. W. 337 (1926); Johns v. City
of Pendleton, 66 Ore. 182, 133 Pac. 817, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 990 (1913).
5'City of Quincy v. Kemper, 304 Ill. 303, 136 N. E. 763 (1922).5 2See notes 53-57 infra.
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product is essential to the rendering 6f proper public service, he should not
be barred from using it5 3 or, be satisfied with anything asserted to be
equally as good,54 nor should he be required to speculate with an uncertain
material, even if it costs less,5 5 especially when the specified product is the
only suitable one.5 6 This rule has been approved in cases where public agen-
cies have had previous satisfactory results from the use of a monopolized
material, 57 particularly when it is sold to all contractors at the same price.56
This kind of specification, nevertheless, enables a public agency to protect
itself against being charged excessive prices by its power to decline to pur-
chase the non-competitive product. 9 The judicial philosophy of these hold-
ings is the belief that while the purpose of competitive bidding is to promote
honesty and economy in public contracts, it has not for its aim the depriva-
tion of public agencies of the right to procure the best available implement,
simply because it is held in monopoly or is procurable from only a limited
source. To deprive public bodies, in this day of scientific advancement, of
the use of a monopolized article wotild take from them the opportunity of
rendering the most efficient and economical service.60 Therefore, as with
patented articles, when public officials ihonestly decide without fraud, bad
faith or corruption that a non-competitive medium is best for their purpose,
the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the public officials. 61
However, if the thing specified is one of common manufacture or mining,
to require that it be obtained from a single source or manufacturer is
illegal, when the same article of equal excellence is manufactured or mined
by others.6 2 Unless a monopoly is based solely on the excellence of the
53Newark v. Bonnel, 57 N. J. L. 424, 31 Atl. 408 (1895) ; Kingston Bituminous Prod-
ucts Co. v. City of Long Branch, 124 N. J. L. 472, 12 A. (2d) 237 (1940).54Holmes v. Common Council of Detroit, 120 Mich. 226, 79 N. W. 200 (1899).-55Ryan v. City of Paterson, 66 N. J. L. 533, 49 Atl. 587 (1901).
56Swift v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 80, 79 S. W. 172 (1904) ; Keokuk Water Works
Co. v. City of Keokuk, 224 Iowa 718, 277 N. W. 291 (1938).
57City of Springfield y. Haydon, 216 Ky. 483, 288 S. W. 337 (1926); Smith v. City
of Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P. (2d) 588 (1937); Kingston Bituminous Products Co.
v. City of Long Branch, 124 N. 3. L. 472, 12 A. (2d) 237 (1940).58Gualco v. City of Bakersfield, 86 Cal. App. 167, 260 Pac. 308 (1927); Eckerle v.
Ferris, 175 Okla. 107, 51 P. (2d) 766 (1935).
59Cf. Hobart v. City of Detroit, 17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185 (1868).
60Smith v. City of Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P. (2d) 588 (1937).61Custer v. City of Springfield, 167 Mo. App. 354, 151 S. W. 759 (1912) ; Cleveland
Trinidad Paving Co. v. Lord, 145 Mo. App. 141, 130 S. W. 371 (1910) ; Smith v. City of
Seattle, supra note 57.62Larned v. City of Syracuse, 17 App. Div. 19, 44 N. Y. Supp. 857 (4th Dep't 1897);
Smith v. Syracuse Improvement Co., 161 N. Y. 484, 55 N. E. 1077 (1900) ; Schoenberg v.
Field, 95 Mo. App. 242, 68 S. W. 945 (1902); Diamond v. City of Mankato, 89 Minn.
48, 93 N. W. 911, 61 L. R. A. 448 (1903) ; National Surety Co. v. Kansas City Hydrau-
lic Press Brick, 73 Kan. 196, 84 Pac. 1034 (1906); Curtice v. Schmidt, 202 Mo. 703,
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product, it cannot be utilized by a public official. 6 3 Therefore, where there
are asphalts of equal excellence it is illegal to specify an asphalt from a single
source ;64 the same is true of paving brick,6 5 stone from a single quarry, 66
or cement for paving purposes.67 Such an illegal monopoly is not validated
by stating an upset price at which it should be secured from the single
source.
68
Alternate Rule
In practice the two original rules of procurement concerning patented
devices for public agencies were, as previously indicated, far from satisfac-
tory in some respects. To improve the situation a method was devised for
securing bids based upon the specification in the alternative of several articles
which served the same purpose, with the final selection being made after all
the bids were opened and considered. 69 In this manner two kinds of com-
petition are carried on simultaneously: (1) between different products (alter-
nates), and (2) upon the same product. ° Business men, in conducting their
101 S. W. 61 (1907) ; Taylor v. Schroeder, 130 Mo. App. 483, 110 S. W. 26 (1908);
Muff v. Cameron, 134 Mo. App. 607, 114 S. W. 1125 (1908); Glennon v. Gates, 136
Mo. App. 421, 118 S. W. 98 (1909) ; State v. Amlin, 13 Ohio Dec. 334 (1902) ; Kratz
v. Allentown, 304 Pa. St. 51, 55, 155 Atl. 116, 117 (1931) ; McCutcheon v. City of
Shreveport, 157 La. 699, 102 So. 875 (1925).63Curtice v. Schmidt, 202 Mo. 703, 101 S. W. 61 (1907); Wegmann Realty Co. v.
City of St. Louis, 329 Mo. 972, 47 S. W. (2d) 770 (1932).
64Diamond v. City of Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N. W. 911 (1903).
6 5 See cases cited note 62 mtpra.6 6 State v. Amlin, 13 Ohio Dec. 334 (1902) ; Kratz v. Allentown, 304 Pa. St. 51, 155 Atl.
116 (1931).
67Cf. Swift v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 80, 79 S. W. 172 (1904).
6 8Larned v. City of Syracuse, 17 App. Div. 19, 44 N. Y. Supp. 857 (4th Dep't 1897);
Glennon v. Gates, 136 Mo. App. 421, 118 S. W. 98 (1909), cited with approval in Hillig
v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 291, 85 S. W. (2d) 91(1935).69 Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263 (1872) ; Gage v. City of Chicago, 207
Ill. 56, 69 N. E. 588 (1904) ; Baltimore City v. Flack, 104 Md. 107, 64 At. 702 (1906) ;
Parker v. City of Philadelphia, 220 Pa. St. 208, 69 Atl. 671 (1908); Campbell v.
Southern Bitulithic Co., 32 Ky. Law. Rep. 777, 106' S. W. 1189 (1908); De Neffe v.
Duby, 115 Ore. 511, 239 Pac. 109 (1925); Hodges v. City of Roswell, 31 N. M. 384,
247 Pac. 310 (1926); Brener v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. St. 182, 157 At. 466
(1931); Burns v. Broderick, 140 Misc. 859, 251 N. Y. Supp. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
This method of securing alternate bids on pavements contracts is authorized by statute
in some jurisdictions, so that patented pavements may be selected after all the bids are
received if the awarding official deems it to be in the best interest of the city to lay a
patented pavement. Vilbig Bros. v. City of Dallas, 127 Tex. 563, 91 S. W. (2d) 336
(1936) ; motion for rehearing overruled, 127 Tex. 573, 96 S. W. (2d) 229 (1936);
Bechthold v. City of Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 544, 277 N. W. 657 (1938). See note in
(1935) 96 A. L. R. 712, discussing validity of seeking bids on the basis of alternate
materials.
70 Chief Justice Christiancy, in Attorntey General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263, at 276,
speaking of a street pavement contract, but which remarks are true of anything else, said:
"When the pavement of a street is in contemplation, there are two kinds of competition
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usual commercial dealings, receive bids upon this basis, sometimes described
as "duplex competition," with beneficial results to themselves. It cannot
be presumed that the legislature in prescribing competitive bidding intended
- to deprive public agencies of this 'satisfactory business technique.7 The
more diverse are the products brought into the contest, the greater will be
the competition.72 Since preference for the article to be purchased is deter-
mined after the bids are received, it is improbable that those seeking the
adoption of their product will ask exorbitant prices.73
Under this plan the initial choice of the type of product to be purchased
is not determined by the lowest price submitted on any of the alternates. The
awarding officer, after taking into' consideration all the necessary factors,
chooses the type of product or article, i.e., alternate, which in his judgment
is best for the public needs; but once such selection is made, the award must
go to the lowest, or lowest responsible, or lowest and best bidder thereon,
depending on the statutory standard.74
When the statute provides that the material to be bought must be selected
in advance of the advertising for bids this alternate method of soliciting
bids is illegal. 75
There are various methods of receiving bids by this alternate method. The
simplest method is to set forth the specifications of an unpatented, but
monopolized article as the standard and require the alternate to be its equal
with regard to quality or other essential factors.
76
But the method just described cannot be applied in the case of a patented
article. To describe the patented article as the standard necessarily excludes
all alternates. Where the commodity to be furnished is in a field consisting
entirely of patented articles, a method that may be adopted is to establish a
general specification that any of the articles can meet, with the awarding
officer selecting the type and make that he considers best adapted to the
work to be performed.7 7 In such a case the patentee can be asked to furnish
which it is very desirable to create among those who may wish to undertake the work:
First, that between the different kinds of pavement, or those prepared to engage in put-
ting them down; and second, that between parties prepared to put down the same ki td'71Baltimore City v. Flack, 104 Md. 107, 130, 64 Ati. 702, 711 (1906).
72Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263, 271-272. Cf. Landsborough v. Kelly, 1
Cal. (2d) 739, 37 P. (2d) 93, 96 A. L. R. 707 (1934).
73See note 71 suP ra.
7 4 See Attorney General v. Detroit; Baltimore City v. Flack; Campbell v. Southern
Bitulithic Co.; De Neffe v. Duby, all cited supra note 69.7 5Stocking v. Warren Brothers, 134 Wis. 235, 114 N. W. 789 (1908). This rule has
been changed. Wis. STAT. (1939) § 62.15, sub. 7.
70Gage v. City of Chicago, 207 Ill. 56, 69 N. E. 588 (1904).7 7Parker v. Philadelphia, 220 Pa. St. 208, 69 Atl. 671 (1908). The absence of any
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his own specification. 78 Another scheme is to specify one patented article,
and, as its alternate, describe the article with all its patented features elim-
inated.79 Of course, one patented device and other patented or unpatented
devices performing the same function may be specified as alternates.
In selecting the altern[te and making the award thereon, regardless of
whether the award niust be made to the lowest or lowest responsible bidder,
the quailty and adaptability of the article to the particular requirements of
the job may be considdred. 80
Equal Opportunity Rule
There is unanimity of opinion that the use of patented articles or processes
is very often of advantage to the pubfic service.8 ' To overcome the objection
'that the specification of a patented medium precludes the competition called
for by the statutes requiring competitive bidding, still another plan has been
devised for securing all the competition that the circumstances allow.,
The idea appears to have been first suggested in Dean v. Charlton, supra.
Under this plan all bidders have an equal opportunity to secure the patented.
portion of the specifications upon the same terms from the patent holder.
This equality for the bidders is obtained by the contracting agency secur-
ing from the patentee, before the advertisement for bids, a binding agree-
ment that he will allow any successful bidder to use his process upon pay-
'ment of a fixed royalty; or, in the case of a patented article, that he will
sell the patented contrivance to any successful bidder at a stated price.
This method gives a public agency several beneficial results: (1) it per-
mits the use of patents for the benefit of the public service; (2) it prevents
the patentee from using his monopoly to charge exorbitant prices as to those
specifications where alternate bids are employed is illegal, Sweezey v. Mayor of Malden,
273 Mass. 536, 174 N. E. 269 (1931).78Penniman v. Bennett, 224 Ill. App. 53 (1922); Brener v. City of Philadelphia, 305
Pa. St. 182, 157 AtI. 466 (1931); cf. Bechthold v. City of Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 544,
277 N. W. 657 (1938).79Brener v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. St. 182, 157 Atl. 466 (1931) ; cf. Patterson v.
Zanesville, 42 Ohio App. 428, 182 N. E. 352 (1932), motion to certify record overruled,
42 Ohio App. xlvi.
S0Cleveland Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 55 Barb. 288
(Sup. Ct. 1869) ; West v. City of Oakland, 30 Cal. App. 560, 159 Pac. 202. 204 (1916) ;
Hodgeman v. City of San Diego, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 610, 128 P. (2d) 412 (1942);
Mitchell v. Walden Motors Co., 235 Ala. 34, 177 So. 151 (1937).81Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 509, 99 Am. Dec. 205 (1868) ; Hobart v. City of Detroit,
17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185 (1868); Fishburn v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 338, 49
N. E. 532, 39 L. R. A. 482 (1898) ; Saunders v. City of Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111
N. W. 529, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 392 (1907).
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things which are not within the terms of his patent grant;82 (3) it places
it within the power of a public agency to name the price for the patented im-
plement or process, by recognizing its right to decline to call for it if the
price asked is not reasonable.8 3 But under this rule no power can properly
be given to the patentee to select the successful bidder. Accordingly, a pro-
vision which gives the patentee the power to choose the successful bidder
upon the basis of his plant and equipment being most satisfactory to the
patentee is illegal.8 4
This rule of equal opportunity obviously cannot be applied in the case where
the contract to be awarded calls for furnishing a single patented or monopolized
article, as it is self-evident, that in such a case, there can be no competition.8 5
The rule of equal opportunity has been accepted in many jurisdictions be-
cause of its efficacy. 6 It enables public agencies to obtain all the competition
82Cf. Matter of Eager, 46 N. Y. 100 (1871); Temple v. City of Portland, 77 Ore.
559, 151 Pac. 724 (1915).
83in People v. Van Nort, 65 Barb. 331 (Gen. Term, 1st Dep't [1873)), speaking of
soliciting bids on a patented article by public advertisement, the court said (p. 333):
"There is no opportunity for any competition, in consequence of the patent, and the public
officer might more advantageously, and with as much propriety, negotiate for a contract
directly, as to receive proposals." See Baird v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 567, 582 (1884). See also
Addressograph Sales Agency v. County of Lucerne, 32 Lucerne Leg. Reg. 444 (1938).8 4 Monaghan v. City of Indianapolis, 37 Ind. App. 280, 76 N. E. 424 (1905). But cf.
Grimes v. City of Seaside, 87 Ore. 256, 170 Pac. 310 (1918).
85Cf. concurring opinion of Sullivan, J., in McEwen v. City of Coeuer d'Alene, 23
Idaho 746, 771472, 132 Pac. 308, 317 (1913).
S6 Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St. 585, 595 (1885) ; Kilvington v. City of Superior,
83 Wis. 222, 53 N. W. 487, 18 L. R. A. 45 (1892); Perine Contracting and Paving Co.
v. Quackenbush, 104 Cal. 684, 38 Pac. 533 (1894); State 6f Kansas v. Shawnee Co.,
57 Kan. 267, 45 Pac. 616 (1896); Bye v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J. L. 402, 64 AUt.
1056 (1906) ; Saunders v. City of Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111 N. W. 529, 9 L. R. A.
(N. S) 392 (1907); LaCoste v. Cify of New Orleans, 119 J.a. Ann. 469, 44 So. 267
(1907); Milner v. City of Trenton, 80 N. J. L. 253, 75 A t. 939 (1910); Tousey v.
City of Indianapolis, 175 Ind. 295, 94 N. E. 225 (1912) ; Reed v. Rockcliff-Gibson Con-
struction Co., 25 Okla. 633, 107 Pac. 168 (1910) ; Ford v. City of.Great Falls, 46 Mont.
292, 127 Pac. 1004 (1912) ; Johns v. City of Pendleton, 66 Ore. 182, 133 Pac. 817, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 990 (1913); McEwen v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 746, 132 Pac. 308
(1913); Whitmore, Rauber & Vicinus v. Edgerton, 87 Misc. 216, 149 N. Y. Supp. 508,
aff'd., 167 App. Div. 508, 152 N. Y. Supp. 1149 (4th Dep't 1915); Great Northern
Railroad Co. v. City of Leavenworth, 81 Wash. 511, 142 Pac. 1155 (1914); Sherrett
v. City of Portland, 75 Ore. 449, 147 Pac. 382 (1915); Wurdeman v. City of Colum-
bus, 100 Neb. 134, 158 N. W. 924 (1916); Farmer v. Dahl, 19 Ariz. 395, 171 Pac.
130 (1918) ; Wagoner v. City of La Grande, 89 Ore. 192, 173 Pac. 305 (1918) ; Grimes
v. City of Seaside, 87 Ore. 256, 170 Pac. 310 (1918) ; Burns v. City of Nashville, 142
Tenn. 541, 221 S. W. 828 (1920) ; Adams v. Van Zandt, 199 N. Y. Supp. 225 '(Sup. Ct.
1923), aff'd, 219 App. Div. 761, 219 N. Y. Supp. 766 (4th Dep't 1927), af'd, 246 N. Y.
642, 159 N. E. 684 (1927) ; Sanborn v. City of Boulder, 74 Colo. 358, 221 Pac. 2077
(1923); Woodworth v. Town of Sebastopol, 72 Cal. App. 187, 236 Pac. 981 (1925);
Delahoussaye v. Board of Trustees of City of New Iberia, 158-La. Ann. 566, 104 So.
370 (1925) ; Litchfield v. City of Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 131 AtI. 560 (1925) ; Brydon
v. City of Hermosa Beach, 93 Cal. App. 615, 270 Pac. 255 (1928), rehearing denied
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the situation permits, and at the same time avail themselves of new discover-
ies and improvements.8 7 Those jurisdictions that have failed to adopt the
equal' opportunity rule have done so upon the hypothesis that this method
does not permit the competition called for by the statute as to the supplying
of the patented article itself.88
Where the methods for securing patented things or using patented pro-
cesses are prescribed by the statute, the equal opportunity rule cannot be
employed if it conflicts with such statute. Thus, if the charter requires a
city to obtain the right to use the patented article, or process upon the pay-
ment of a stated royalty before awarding the contract, it is illegal to permit
the patentee to consent to sell his patented article or permit the use of his
process to any bidder at a fixed price.ssa It is likewise illegal to use this pro-
cedure where the statute prohibits the procurement of patented articles
unless "a fair and reasonable opportunity for competition" is had, and in
* such a case there must be competition in furnishing the patented feature
itself.8 9
The right of the patentee to bid on the contract for which he has agreed
to sell his patent at a fixed price to any successful bidder has been questioned.
The better view maintains that since the patentee's profit on his patent is
secured whether or not he obtains the contract, his entry in the field for the
* contract provides additional competition. This is particularly so when the
patent is also being offered in competition with other articles under the alter-
nate rule, supra, and no one is willing to submit a bid based on the patent
but the patentee himself. 91 However, there are many dicta to the effect that
the patentee cannot bid.92 If the price to be paid for the patented implement
and petition for hearing denied by the Supremie Court, 93 Cal. App. 931, 270 Pac. 255(1928) ; Beckwith v. City of New Rochelle, 138 Misc. 62, 245 N. Y. Supp. 21 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1929), aff'd, 230 App. Div. 785, 245 N. Y. Supp. 21 (2d Dep't 1930) ; Hoffman v.
City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N. W. 430, 77 A. L. R. 680 (1930).8TSaunders v. City of Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111 N. W. 529, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.)
392 (1907), cited with approval, Hoffman v. Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N. W.
430 (1930).
88Siegel v. City of Chicago, 223 Ill. 428, 79 N. E. 280 (1906).
88
'Allen v. City of Milwaukee, 128 Wis. 678, 106 N. W. 1099 (1906).
8 9Rose v. Low, 85 App. Div. 461, 83 N. Y. Supp. 598 (lst Dep't 1903), cited with ap-
proval in Polansky v. Walsh, 220 App. Div. 559, 222 N. -Y. Supp. 120 (1st Dep't 1927).9 0La Coste v. City of New Orleans, 119 La. Ann. 469, 44 So. 267 (1907) ; Whitmore,
Rauber & Vicinus v. Edgerton, 87 Misc, 216,'149 N. Y. Supp. 508, aff'd, 167 App. Div.
960, 152 N. Y. Supp. 1149 (4th Dep't 1915), cited with approval in Adams v. Van Zandt,
219 App. Div. 761, 219 N. Y. Supp. 766 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd, 246 N. Y. 642, 159
N. E. 684 (1927) ; Litchfield v. City of Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 131 Atl. 560 (1925)
Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N. W. 430 (1930).
91 Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N. W. 430 (1930).9 2McEwen v. City of Coeur d'A1ene, 23 Idaho 746, 132 Pac. 308 (1913); Burns v.
City of Nashville, 142 Tenn. 541, 221 S. W. 828 (1920).
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is so exorbitant as to give the patentee an advantage over his competitors
which enables him to secure the contract, it may well be that the courts will
declare a contract so obtained illegal and void.93 The courts should go far
to maintain fair dealings when the equal opportunity rule is employed. In a
case where the patentee gave one of the bidders a secret advantage so that
the favored bidder could secure the contract, the contract obtained by such
bidder was declared unenforceable, for the practice of giving a secret advan-
tage to a favored bidder tended to deter others from bidding and would
thereby lessen and possibly wipe out the very competition which the equal
opportunity rule sought to encourage.94
Sometimes the patent covers, not the material, but the process, such as the
construction of a gravel road. In such a case it is held that the patentee
cannot by a suit for contributory infringement prevent a supplier from sell-
ing the unpatented materials to a contractor, even though the supplier knows,
that the contractor intends to use the patentee's process. 95 The significance
of this holding appears in those instances where the patent is a process and the
equal opportunity agreement provides for the use of the process with the
purchase of the unpatented materials from the patentee at fixed prices. Such
an arrangement has been held illegal as it creates for the benefit of the
patentee an unauthorized and illegal monopoly on unpatented materials which
are not within the protection of his patent grant.96 But if such unpatented
material of the patentee is of especial excellence, under the monopolized arti-
cle rule, supra, it can be specified and the prices at which it is to be procured
from the patentee likewise fixed in the license or equal opportunity agree-
ment.9
7
When a public agency has an equal opportunity agreement on a patented
device for its contractors and itself, and it legally undertakes to perform work
that is ordinarily let at competitive bidding, there appears to be no valid ob-
93 johnson v. Atlantic City, 82 N. J. L. 204, 81 Atl. 1105 (1911).
94Ibid. See also State ex rel. Washington Paving Co v. Clausen, 90 Wash. 450, 156
Pac. 554, L. R. A. 1917 A 436 (1916), where the contract was held only voidable
before performance because there were alternates specified which created competition.95In Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 288 (1938)
the court held that the owner of a patent cannot "extend the monopoly (of his patent)
to unpatented material used in practicing the invention," and that "every use of a
patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented materials is! prohibited.
It applies whatever the nature of the device by which \the owner of the patent seeks to
effect such unauthorized extension of the monopoly."
OsSee Seibert v. City of Indianapolis, 40 Ind. App. 296, 81 N. E. 99 (1907), as ex-
plained in Tousey v. City of Indianapolis, 175 Ind. 295, 94 N. E. 225 (1911).97Swift v. City of St. Louis, 180 Mo. 80, 79 S. W. 172 (1904) ; Gualco v. City of
Bakersfield, 86 Cal. App. 167, 260 Pac. 308 (1927).
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jection to its taking advantage of such agreement and securing the patented
article under the terms stated therein, even though it is not at public letting.
98
Of course, all other items in the project would have to be obtained on com-
petitive bids if the value of each came within the range that required com-
petitive bidding.
Repair Rule
Patented articles often wear out within their normal life and have to be
replaced. The right of an owner of a patented article to make a repair or
replacement to it is not within the scope of this article. 99 But it can be stated
as a proper rule of procedure in the procurement of such repair or replace-
ment parts that if their purchase from a, source other than the patentee or
his authorized licensee wotild constitute an infringement of the patent, guch
repair or 'replacement parts may be obtained by private negotiation from the
patentee or his licensee.' 0 0 If there are several licensees competitively en-
gaged in supplying these repair parts, there appears to be no reason why
these parts should not be obtained on the basis of competitivebidding. On
the other hand, if there can be no claim for infringement, these repair or re-
placement parts should be purchased upon the basis of competitive bidding.
Statutory Methods in Various States and Cities
After the adoption of the permissive rule in New York,' 0 ' the legislature,
fearful of the liberal features of this rule, adopted a more restrictive method
for procuring patented articles for the City of New York.'0 2 On the other
hand, in Wisconsin, where the rigid rule of exclusion was approved,'
3
the legislature assisted its public corporations by permitting them to secure
and use patented articles under procedures somewhat similar to those of the
equal opportunity and alternate rules.'04 In Illinois the use of the restrictive
98Cf. Warren Brothers Co. v. Boyle, 42 Cal. App. 246, 257 et seq., 183 Pac. 706 (1919).
99This question is treated in: WALKER, PATENTS (Deller ed. 1937) §§ 379, 509;
AWDUR, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE '(1935) 672-688; ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS AND
LICENSES (2d ed. 1943) §§ 500-501. See also Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co.,
152 U. S. 425, 14 S. Ct. 627 (1894).
l00Silsby Manufacturing Co. v. Allentown, 153 Pa. St. 319, 26 Atl. 646 (1893). This
rule is recognized in the statutory method of procuring patented articles provided by the
New York city charter (§ 348) by excepting repairs from the competitive method
established there for procuring patented articles. See also Yingling v. Dunlap, 68 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 425 (1917), cited with approval in Sheets v. Armstrong, 307 Pa. St. 385, 161
AtI. 359 (1932).
'OlMatter of Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513 (1872).
10 2See note 16 snpra.
'0sDean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dec. 205 (1868).l04Supra note 18; and see Wis. STAT. (1939) § 62.15, sub. s. 7, 8.
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rule became a costly proposition, for, in precluding competition from patented
pavements, it resulted in high road construction costs. In an endeavor to
overcome this condition, the alternate rule was observed to permit competi-
tion from patented roadways.10 5
Ohio adopted a limited exclusion rule by prohibiting the specification of
"the exclusive use of a patented article or process protected by a trade-mark or
an article or process wholly controlled by any person, firm or corporation or
combination thereof.' 1 6 In the city of New Orleans, the exclusion rule with
all its severity was enacted into law for paving contracts.10 Pennsylvania, on
the other hand, gave legislative sanction to the permissive rule with bll its
liberal features for certain purchases by a designated type of municipal cor-
poration.108
Under a statute allowing the purchase of patented articles "under such cir-
cumstances that there can be a fair and reasonable opportunity for competi-
tion," with the conditions therefor 'to be prescribed by the local governing
body, the use of the equal opportunity rule, allowing a specified patented
device to be obtained by any bidder at the same price has been held illegal
upon the ground that no competition upon the patented article itself is thereby
possible.10 9 Under such a statute the correct procedure is to adopt the alter-
105ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) Ch. 121, § 176. The method outlined under this
statute is very similar to that provided for in New Jersey to overcome the effect
of the permissive rule. See note 17 supra.
10oO io GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 3811. Under this regulation the use of a
monopolized but unpatented article is also banned from being exclusively specified, even
'though it is considered the best article on the market. Mog v. City of Cleveland, 27
Ohio Dec. 62, 18 N. P. Rep. (N. S.) 49 (1915). The holding in Patterson v. Zaiesville,
42 Ohio App. 428, 182 N. E. 352 (1932), motion to certify the record overruled, 42 Ohio
App. xlvi, approves a pocedure to meet the requirements of this statute, a general speci-
fication which does not contain any of the details of any one single manufacturer. Se
also Fox v. City of Cincinnati, 7 0. 0. 7, 22 Ohio Law Abstract 290 (1936), which held
that this statute does not apply where the specification does not call for an article con-
trolled by one bidder, but which can be manufactured by .those in the business "at reason-
able and justifiable outlays."
107City Charter of New Orleans § 44 (e), amended, Act 338 of 1936 of Louisiana.
This statute, it seems, invalidates the New Orleans rule of equal opportunity on paving
contracts. See note 116 infra.
10sPA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 53, § 15401. The act provides as follows:
"The borough authorities shall not be required to prepare specifications and advertise
for the purchase of articles or parts thereof which are patented and manufactured prod-
ucts, apparatus or appliances, nor in all such cases shall they be required to exact a
bond: Provided, This Act shall not apply to materials used in street improvenlents."
For a construction of this statute read Gerhart v. Getz, 28 D. & C. 291. (1936).
0 9 Rose v. Low, 85 App. Div. 461, 83 N. Y. Supp. 598 (1st Dep't 1903). In Allen v.
City of Milwaukee, 128 Wis. 678, 106 N. W. 1099, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 680 (1906), a similar
holding was made against they validity of the equal opportunity rule where the statute
authorizing the procurement of patented articles intended to have competition on the
patented work itself by the city securing from the patentee a license to use his patent.
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nate method, so that the patented device itself competes with -other unpatented
or patented devices employed for the same purpose.110 It is obvious that under
such'a stattte, calling for competition, a specification which femands bids
only ,upon A patented article is void."' An article which is itself unpatented,
though made by a patented machine, but competes with some other un-
patented articles mentioned in the contract +or the award, does not come
within the condemnation of this statute. 1 2 But this is not so when a single
article is specified and it is manufactured by a patented machine."13 Where
competition exists under the conditions outlined by the governing board, a
taxpayer cannot by judicial action require the board to include additional
classes of work in the contract so that there may be further competition.14
There are countless variants in the laws regulating the procurement of
patented articles. The New York city charter dispenses with competitive bid-
ding when a stated percentage of the local governing body considers the
purchase of a patented article desirable, and when competition on it cannot
be secured.115 A New Orleans statute adopts the same idea whether or not
competition can be secured." 6 Other statutes adopt a straight equal oppor-
'
1 OWarren Brothers v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 297, 83 N. E. 59 (1907).
1"Kay v. Moore, 93 App. Div. 484, 87 N. Y. Supp. 831 (2d Dep't 1904). After the
injunction pendente lite in this case was affirmed, the action went to trial on the
merits resulting in a permanent injunction which was again affirmed by the Appellate
Division (109 App. Div. 913, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1138 [2d Dep't 1905]) and by the Court
of Appeals (185 N. Y. 591 [19061).
"12Holly v. City of New York, 128 App. Div. 499, 112 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1st Dep't
1908).
113 Gordon v. Sturgis, 28 N. Y. L. J. 1894 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. February 25, 1903).
In Lamborn v. Hutton, 132 Kan. 226, 294 Pac. 676 (1931), where the statute prohibited
"the naming of the brand of material or the name of the manufacturer thereof," a con-
tract providing for the impacting of concrete, which could only be done with patented
machines which the patentee agreed to lease to any bidder at the same price, was
nevertheless held to be illegal. See also Pollock v. Kansas City, 87 Kan. 205, 123 Pac.
985, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465 (1912). However, where the purchase of a patented article
is prohibited, unless there has been a "fair and reagonable opportunity for competition,"
a contract not for the purchase of a patented article, but calling only for its use by the
contractor has been upheld. Stockton v. City of Buffalo, 108 App. Div. 170, 95 N. Y.
Supp. 509 (4th Dep't 1905).
Similarly, in Neacy v. City of Milwaukee, 171 Wis. 311, 176 N. W. 871 (1920), in-
volving the statute described in Allen v. Milwaukee, supra note 109, a contract calling
for an unpatented pole to be made only by a process which was patented was held to be
illegal because the statute intended to cover any product which is not at all the subject
of competition because of the protection of patents.
1 4Hastings Pavements Co. v. Cromwell, 67 Misc. 212, 124 N. Y. Supp. 388 (1910),
appeal dismissed, 143 App. Div. 942, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dep't 1911).
'
15New York city charter § 348 (1938).
"16 New Orleans city charter § 29a (Act 254 of 1918 of Louisiana) ; but as to patented
pavements, the equal opportunity rule must be used. Cf. note 107 smpra; see also Los
Angeles city charter § 386.
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tunity rule." 7 The alternate rule has been used, but with modifications. In
New Jersey, where the alternate rule was selected for paving work, the re-
quirement was added that the patented pavement could be specified if it
were brought into competition with an equivalent type of non-patented pave-
ment."18 Therefore, under this law the specification of a patented machine-
rolled pavement against an unpatented band-laid pavement was improper and
a contract advertised on this basis was illegal."19 A similar statute, provid-
ing for the specification of three distinct types of pavements, was held not
observed when three diiferent methods of mixing the same ingredients were
specified so that the final product was the same pavement.1
20
Naturally, when the law authorizes the specification of a patented article,
there is no legal compulsion to apply any of the devices which permit of com-
petition, such as the equal opportunity or alternate rules or others Imentioned
in thig article.' 2 ' Some charter provisions, at the outset, preclude the raising
of any question as to the legality of ordering a patented article, even though
competitive bidding is required, by expressly providing that the require-
ment of competition shall not "prevent the city from contracting for the
doing of work with patented processes or from purchasing patented appli-
ances."'
122
Federal Procurement of Patented Articles
The agencies of the federal government are able to, secure for their use
any patented article, material or process. This is made possible by an act
of Congress authorizing the sovereign to exercise its right of eminent domain
as to the patents, upon payment of compensation to the patentee.'2 Under
1 7Los Angeles Charter (St. 1925, p. 1037), Art. 1, § 3, subd. 10 as explained in
Braun, Bryant & Austin v. McGuire, 201 Cal. 134, 255 Pac. 808 (1927) ; L. 1919, Ch. 40
of Wisconsin.
I'SSupra note 17.
"19E. J. Flaherty Co. v. Town of Kearney, 107 N. J. L. 45, 150 Ati. 676 (1930), aff'd,
107 N. J. L. 518, 154 Atl. 627 (1931).
'
20Putman v. Murden, 97 Ind. App. 313, 184 N. E. 796 (1933).
1 21U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. California-Arizona Construction Co., 21 Ariz.
172, 186 Pac. 502 (1920) ; Feland v. City of Phoenix, 25 Ariz. 317, 217 Pac. 65 (1923).
12 2 Spokane city charter § 37 (1939).
12336 STAT. 851 (1910), amended, 40 STAT. 705 (1918), 35 U. S. C. § 68 (Supp. 1943),
the pertinent parts of which read: 'Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States shall be used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same,
such owner's remedy shall be by suit against the United States in the Court of Claims
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.
*** In any such suit the United States may avail itself of any and all defenses, general
or special, that might be pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement, as set
forth in this chapter, or otherwise. ***"A study of the operation of this law is to be found in an editorial note by Arthur H.
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this law the rights of the patentee under his patent are appropriated for the
use of the government with the entire burden of compensation to the patentee
for such appropriation being assumed by.the United States,1 24 thereby pro-
tecting the government's contractor in the use of the, patent from the re-
straints of an injunction suit and from any liability in damages to the
patent holder.125 The statute, in effect, prevents the suppression of a patent
so far as the national government is concerned. 126
However, if a federal contract does not specify or require the use of a
patent, its use by a contractor for his own convenience in performance of his
contract is not under the protection of the act, and he may be pnjoined from
using such patent and be liable in damages to the' patentee for infringe-
ment.1
27
Conclusion
No insurmountable barrier exists to the acquisition of patented articles
by public bodies. Any judicial or ostatutory impediments can be removed
by appropriate remedial statutes, as the source of the problem is of legisla-
tive origin.
One question which has received considerable attention in the field of
patents is their suppression or non-exploitation by their owners. The Tem-
porary National Emergency Committee has suggested a solution, recommend-
ing the enactment of legislati6n requiring that all future patents be made
Behrens and George C. Roemig entitled, Recovery for Government Use of Patented In-
ventions (1940) 9 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 217; see also Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. Rv.
1051. This type of legislation has been called a "compulsory contract" as it restricts
the patentee to securing his compensktion for infringement from the Federal Government.
See Lenhoff, The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper (1943) 43 CoL. L. REv. 587,
589.
124Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 48 Sup. Ct. 194 (1928).
The statute as originally adopted only protected government officials from an injunction
for infringement [Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 32 Sup. Ct. 488 (1912)], but not the
government contractor [Cramp & Sons v. Curtis Turbine Co., 246 U. S. 28, 38 Sup. Ct.
271 (1918)]. To overcome this situation, during World War I an amendment was made
to the statute, which is its present form, so that a government contractor was also pro-
tected from an injunction suit and a claim for damages for infringement. The historical
background of the amendment of the statute will be found in Wood v. Atlantic Gdf &
Pacific Co., 296 Fed. 718 (S. D. Ala. 1924). See also Fening, Patent Infringement by
the Government (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 773.
'
25 Cramp & Sons v. Curtis Turbine Co., 246 U. S. 28, 38 Sup. Ct. 271 (1918) ; Broome
v. Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co., 92 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); Pollen v.
Ford Instrument Co., 108 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Western Electric Co. v.
Hammond, 135 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943).
126This is confirmed by the report of the National Patent Planning Commission,
H. R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Congress, 1st Sess. (1943) pp. 2, 10.
127Wood v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 296 Fed. 718 (S. D. Ala. 1924).
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available for use by anyone upon the payment of a fair price for this privi-
lege, with judicial or administrative machinery to determine whether the
royalty demanded is reasonable or prohibitive. 28 The National Patent Plan-
ning Commission, in its initial report, has reached the conclusion that the
incorporation of such a general system in our patent laws would not be ad-
vantageous, although it is impressed with the need of some degree of com-
pulsion in certain fields, such as national defense, public health and safety.
It therefore recommends a statutory provision that no injunction prohibit-
ing the'use of the patented article shall issue in an infringement suit, when-
ever the court finds that the particular use of the invention is necessary
to the national defense or required in the interests of public health and
safety, and further providing that the owner shall receive reasonable com-
pensation for its use.1
2 9
State legislatures need not wait for Congressional action to secure the
benefits of these proposals for their agencies. Under the sovereign power of
eminent domain they can pass laws for the condemnation of patents along
the same lines as indicated in the federal statute for the appropriation of
patents to the use of the national government, 30 and can delegate the power
'
28Final Report and Recoininendations of the Temporary National Ecowmic Committee,
SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Congress, 1st Session (1941) 36. This recommendation reads as
follows:
"(a) Licensing of Patents-In order to eliminate the use of patents in ways inimical
to the public policy inherent in the patent laws, as well as that of the anti-trust laws, we
recommend that the Congress enact legislation which will require that any future patent
is to be available for use by anyone who may desire'its use and who is willing to pay
a fair price for the privilege. Machinery, either judicial or administrative, should be
set up to determine whether the royalty demanded by the patentee may fairly be' said
to represent reasonable compensation or is intended to set a prohibitive price for such use.
"This proposal is intended to prevent the suppression of patents as well as to provide
for their availability for use in an equitable' manner in any industry where they are a
major factor.
"[Approved. Dissenting: Sumners and Taylor.]"
The quantum of compensation to be given to a patentee when a compulsory license is
granted is discussed in Note (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 843.12 9Report of 'the National Patent Planning Commirsion, H. R. Doc. No. 239, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). This recommendation is based on the fact that the Commission
found that the courts do not grant injunctions against cities in patent infringement suits
where to do so might affect the public health or safety. In support of this view, see
Sommers, Municipal Liability for Patent Infringement (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 162.
130For the statute that can be used as a model for state legislation, with the exception
that the jurisdiction for the recovery of the entire compensation from the municipality
may be laid in a competent local court instead of the Court of Claims, see note 123 supra.
In Cincinnati v. Louisville &' Nashville R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 267
(1912), the court, discussing the power of eminent domain possessed by the states, said
(p. 400) : "But the right of every state to authorize the appropriation of every descrip-
tion of property for a public use is one of those inherent powers which belong to state
governments, without which they could not well perform their functions. It is a power
not surrendered to the United States and is untouched by any of the provisions of the
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of initiating such condemnation to their -various agencies. 131 When such
legislation is adopted, competitive bidding will be in operation without the
need of rules such as heretofore discussed and without the use of statutes
regulating the procurement of patented articles. Further, through the use of
the condemnation procedure public agencies can more effectively deal with
the alleged holders of patents, both valid and invalid, who threaten patent
litigation to curtail competition.
132
Federal Constitution, provided there be due process of law, that is, a law authoriz-
ing it, and provision made for compensation. This power extends to tangibles and intangi-
bles alike." Further, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louis=7le & Nashzille R. R.
Co., 258 U. S. 13, 42 Sup. Ct. 258 (1922) it was iterated that a state has the right to
say upon what property or to what extent the right of eminent domain shall be exer-
cised. In Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 480, 44 Sup. Ct. 369, 370 (1924) it
was said that the right of eminent domain is "superior to property rights . . .and ex-
tends to all property within the jurisdiction of the state."
131The states have the power to delegate their right of eminent domain to their public
subdivisions and agencies. People ex rel. Horton v. Prendergast, 220 App. Div. 351, 358,
222 N. Y. Supp. 29 (3d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 215, 162 N. E. 10 (1928), appeal
dismissed, 278 U. S. 579, 49 Sup. Ct. 177 (1929) ; Peters v. City of Reading, 321 Pa. St.
220, 184 Atl. 23 (1936) ; Williamson v. Housing Authority, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S. E. 43
(1938) ; Romano v. Housing Authority, 123 N. J. L. 428, 10 A. (2d) 181 (1939), aff'd,
124 N. J. L. 452, 12 A. (2d) 384 (1940); Burnham v. Mayor, 309 Mass. 388, 35 N. E.
(2d) 242, 135 A. L. R. 750 (1941).
'
32Russell Forbes, Commissioner of Purchase, in his Report to Mayor, F. H. LaGuardia,
on the Work of the Department of Purchase of the City of New York for the Year 1938,
pp. 21, 31, complained about the use of what he termed "nuisance" patents by reputable
manufacturers to intimidate city contractors with threats of patent litigation to curtail
competition. One instance of such' activity caused the successful contractor to delay de-
liveries to the City of New York for several months, even though the claims of the
patentee were unfounded.
Some interesting statistics are available to show what success patentees have in sus-
taining their patents in litigation. In the Circuit Courts of Appeals during the twelve
years from 1925 to 1936, out of 1449 paients 630 were held to be invalid, i.e., 43.4%. In
addition 27.4% were held not to be infringed [Federico, Patents in The Circuit Courts
of Appeal, 1925-1936 (1938) 20 JouR. PAT. OFF. Soc. 731. A further study made by the
Hon. Evan A. Evans, Circuit Justice, Seventh Circuit [24 JoUR. PAT. OFF. Soc. 19
(1942)] shows that from October 1936 to March 1941, in the Circuit Courts ot
Appeals, 54.11% of the patents were declared invalid and 74.88% were held to be
invalid or not infringed. Justice Evans' study covered patent litigation in the
Supreme Court for the forty years ending in 1940 with the finding that 54.94% of the
patents before that body were found to be invalid, and 74.72% were found to be invalid
or not infringed.
These investigations indicate, at least, that in the Circuit Courts of Appeals "where
the life or death of ninety-nine out of every hundred patents in litigation is determined"
(24 JoUR. PAT. OFF. Soc. 19) 72% of the patents are invalid and/or have not been
infringed.
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